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Introduction 
In early 2006, Florida state policymakers were still enjoying revenue 
prosperity – partially caused by hurricane-recovery activity – and temporarily-
postponed spending stress.  The governor's current budget indicates that fiscal years 
2004 and 2005 featured significant revenue growth (9.2 and 14.5 percent 
respectively).  Fiscal 2006 appears to have brought a relatively modest 5.8 percent 
growth and after adjusting for inflation and population growth, current-year revenue 
is flat or falling slightly. 
The favorable budget climate produced several proposals for disposing of the 
surplus.  The proposals featured a mix of tax relief and new K-12 spending.  
Ultimately, some of the surplus was used on these issues, $715 million was used to 
temporarily bail out the state–run Citizens Property Insurance Corporation and $6.4 
billion was held in reserve. 
Unfortunately for policymakers and residents, the climate ahead is very 
different and could easily consume the reserve balance.  Nominal revenue projections 
for 2007 are $30 million below the expected yield for 2006.  The decline for the total 
will be far worse if the projected sales tax increase of $540 million does not 
materialize (and in Step 3, the reader will find reasons why it may not materialize). 
Beyond the numbers, Florida policymakers and voters have taken four steps 
toward a fiscal train wreck.  For the long-term budget, the ramifications will be 
significant and the specter of providing less services and/or raising taxes looms on the 
horizon. Beyond the budget, the steps also distort decisions in Florida and hurt 
economic welfare. 
In this paper, each issue is introduced with a little history and analysis of the 
distortions that each step has created.  Finally, proposed solutions are reviewed.  The 
good news for Floridians is that forward-thinking policymakers and policy analysts 
have proposed solutions.  The bad news is the proposals typically address one aspect 
of a larger, more complicated problem.  Completely avoiding the fiscal train wreck 
will, in this author’s opinion, require immediate and politically-unpopular changes. 
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The steps to the train wreck are as follows.  In step zero, a lax constitutional 
amendment process develops in Florida and this will be instrumental in creating the 
train-wreck environment.  In step one, policymakers allow Medicaid spending to get 
out of control.  The Medicaid spending aspect of the train wreck is not unique to 
Florida, but the other steps will exacerbate the Medicaid problem.   
Enacting a Save Our Homes amendment is the second step, where 
homesteaders enjoy slow appraisal increases in active real estate markets.  The third 
step is enhancing the structural flaw of the general sales tax with new exemptions.  
The fourth, and final step here, is enacting a class-size amendment to the state 
constitution. 
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Step Zero: Lay the Foundation with an Easily Amendable 
Constitution 
 
In March, 2006, the Florida Department of State reported approximately 50 
active Constitutional Amendment petitions.  The petitions reflect a general pattern 
where small groups of citizens hire consultants to gather signatures and then market 
the amendments.  This route to a Florida Constitutional Amendment is known as the 
initiative-petition process. 
The signature requirement that begins the process is remarkably easy.  
According to the Secretary of State’s office, a group only needs 8 percent of the 
number of electors voting in the last Presidential election (611,009- based on the year 
2004 numbers) to support putting the initiative on the ballot.  Once the signatures are 
verified, the Florida Supreme Court issues a written opinion on whether the initiative 
is to be submitted to the voters. 
With the assistance of “petition management” companies, a special interest 
group can easily submit the required number of signatures.  Between the petition and 
the election, most purchase television and radio advertisements to convince voters to 
support their initiative. 
Two interest groups that deserve specific mention are personal injury 
attorneys and physicians.  The latter group convinced voters to add an amendment 
capping attorney fees from medical malpractice cases.  The former successfully 
marketed amendments that gave potential clients more access to physician records 
and stop physicians with three or more incidents of medical malpractice from 
practicing in Florida.  In essence, the groups fought each other through the creation of 
amendments that are now part of the constitution. 
The author shares the view of others that a state constitution should not be a 
substitute for state statutes.  As the reader will see below, two of the steps to the train 
wreck are constitutional amendments from the initiative-petition process and not from 
representative policy legislation. 
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Reform 
Two options have been widely discussed regarding this step in the fiscal train 
wreck.  The first would follow Nevada policy in adopting a two-election process, 
where a proposed amendment would have to be approved both times.1  Advocates of 
this option point to the precedent from two high-speed rail amendments.  In the 2000 
vote, Floridians approved an amendment that would force state construction of high-
speed rail.  In the 2004 vote, an amendment repealing the high-speed rail amendment 
was approved. 
The second option – advocated by the Florida Chamber of Commerce – 
includes stricter standards on gathering petition signatures and a two-thirds approval 
requirement for most constitutional amendment initiatives.   This would also reduce 
the likelihood of special-interest driven amendments. 
Unlike the fiscal reforms described below, both amendment-reform options 
would move Florida toward a more efficient solution.  Special interest groups would 
still be able to attempt amendments for their policy initiatives, but a higher approval 
threshold or a two-election process would make this strategy more difficult.  Pritchett 
and McClure (2005) summarize a poll indicating the two-election process is slightly 
more popular. 
 
                                                          
1  Pritchett and McClure (2005). 
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Step One: Allow Medicaid Spending to Spiral Out of Control 
By the standard measures, Florida Medicaid spending is relatively low.  For 
example, per-enrollee spending was $3,337 in 2002 while the U.S. average was 
$3,947.2  Spending on children and elderly enrollees were the lowest (as a share of 
the respective U.S. averages) while spending on non-disabled adults was relatively 
close to the national average. 
Spending growth for the program, however, is extremely problematic as it has 
averaged 13 percent per year over the past six years.  By fiscal 2005, Medicaid had 
increased to 24.4 percent of the entire state budget (Medicaid was 5.9 percent in 
1980).3  Total expenditures exceed $14 billion dollars and the program now covers 
2.2 million Floridians.4 
Clearly, unsustainable Medicaid spending growth is not unique to Florida.  
Scott (2005) finds two fundamental sources for rapid spending growth at the federal 
level.  The first is prescription drug benefits where both price and usage have 
increased.  The second is nursing home care.  Scott finds the public share of nursing-
home spending has climbed to 64.1 percent in 2002. 
In Florida, policymakers identify two state-specific sources for the spending 
increase.  The first source is complexity – Florida Medicaid participants can receive 
care through 11 contracted HMOs, a statewide primary care system (called the 
MediPass system) or three enhanced primary care systems.5  According to the 
approved Florida Medicaid Reform Application, the overlapping systems are both 
expensive to administer and dissatisfying to participants. 
State policymakers also believe fraud is a cause for the rapid spending 
growth.  With a program that generates about 140 million claims annually; 
inappropriate payments are considered to be a major problem.  Although no fraud 
data  appear  in  the  reform  application,  several  inappropriate  practices  have  been  
                                                          
2 Similar spending comparisons can be found in Weissert (2005). 
3 Bond (2005). 
4 Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (2005a). 
5 Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (2005a). 
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identified by the Florida Attorney General’s office.  “Pill doctors” and Viagra 
benefits for sex offenders were targeted in 2004 and 2005 respectively.6 
 
Distortions 
Blind and disabled Floridians account for 30 percent of enrollees, but 71 
percent of spending.7  Thus, their benefits are an easy target for policymakers looking 
to shave spending growth from the program.  One strategy was to halt cost-of-living 
adjustments.  Another was to reduce payments to transportation-service providers. 
The inefficiency from Medicaid spending growth is difficult to pin down.  
Legislation that tweaks the edges of program benefits probably adds minor 
inefficiencies to Floridians who now face a less generous safety net.  Higher health 
care prices could have pushed Floridians to prefer dramatic cuts in the system, in 
favor of other spending or tax cuts, but we have no evidence on how residents view 
the program when faced with higher prices. 
One Medicaid-induced distortion deserves special mention.  An industry has 
developed that specializes in establishing Medicaid eligibility for nursing home 
bound Floridians.  For example, Medicaid-friendly annuities are devices generally 
marketed to people who want to establish eligibility for one or both parents.  This 
type of portfolio distortion is a clear inefficiency induced by the Medicaid program; 
and rising nursing home prices have both contributed to device popularity and driven 
more seniors into the Medicaid system. 
 
Waiver 
On October 19th of 2005, Florida policymakers received approval for a 
radically different Medicaid program.  The plan is to begin in two counties with a 
structure that uses a cash (i.e., spending account) and counseling strategy to get 
participants to make their own healthcare choices, rather than fee-for-service 
reimbursement. 
                                                          
6 Crist (2004). 
7 Florida Agency for Health Care Administration (2005b) and Aydin and Turcotte (2005). 
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Ideally, the cash and counseling approach induces participants to either 
consume less healthcare or less-costly healthcare.  Participants also have an incentive 
to help reduce fraud in the system as unspent account balances can be used for 
services that are otherwise not covered (e.g., certain vision and dental care).8 
There are several disadvantages to the initiative.  First, new state staff time 
will be dedicated to educating recipients and providers, as well as creating a risk-
adjustment system to allocate larger account balances to higher-risk patients.   
Second, recipients will only receive emergency services until they enroll in (or a 
assigned to) a plan.   
The final disadvantage is that recipients will be exposed to greater personal 
risk and the exposure will distort the consumption of healthcare.  While the details of 
the Florida waiver are still being worked out, catastrophic care will probably be 
covered for participants even if they have used their allocated account balance.  Non-
catastrophic care probably will not be covered, meaning a recipient who has drained 
her spending account (i.e., a high-spending year) has an incentive to postpone 
healthcare consumption, even when the service is preventative. 
 
                                                          
8 More limited cash and counseling programs have been successful.  According to Redmond and 
Soloman (2005), personal services for chronic health problems is an area where the programs 
work relative well. 
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Step Two: Cap Homestead Assessment Increases Before a Real 
Estate Boom 
 
“(Changes in homestead) assessments shall not exceed the lower of the following: 
a. Three percent (3%) of the assessment for the prior year. 
b. The percent change in the Consumer Price Index ...” 
-- State of Florida Constitution, Article 7, Section 4, 
The Save Our Homes amendment to the Florida Constitution was approved in 
1992.  According to a Herald Tribune feature on the program, part of the appeal was 
to protect older residents from losing their homes to escalating property taxes.  The 
effect of the amendment can be observed in Figure 1 where over the ten year period 
since the amendment came into effect, the differential between assessed value and 
just value for capped Florida property increased 4700 percent.  Using county and 
school  millage  averages,  Florida  homeowners  saved  roughly  $930 million for the 
 
 FIGURE 1.  REAL PROPERTY ASSESSMENT DIFFERENTIAL (ASSESSED VALUE  
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  Source: Florida Department of Revenue. 
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former and $890 million for the latter in 2004.9  Together, the two would account for 
10.6 percent of countywide property tax levies.   
The tax relief generated by the amendment is obviously very popular.  This 
popularity may wane in the future – former Governor Lawton Chiles directed local 
appraisers to recapture under-assessed property in real estate slowdowns – but current 
real estate market conditions have prevented recapture and the savings to long-term 
homeowners have accumulated. 
The Save Our Homes amendment has also created significant problems.  In 
no particular order, they include: 
1) Lock In 
When a homeowner moves anywhere within Florida, they lose all Save Our 
Homes relief.  For $1000 in annual tax relief, moving means sacrificing $15,372 
(over 30 years at 5 percent).  The lock in is generally more pronounced when the 
homeowner owns waterfront property or wants to purchase a larger house in a less 
desirable neighborhood.10 
2) Higher Millage Rates 
Real, per capita property tax collections appear in Figure 2 and they have 
obviously increased for five of the past seven years.  Since assessment on existing 
homesteads cannot increase at this pace, the Save Our Homes cap is inducing local 
policymakers to maintain existing millage rates, or to only slightly reduce the rates, in 
a booming real estate market.  In essence, property taxes on commercial and rental 
parcels have increased dramatically to fund services that homeowners desire, but do 
not have to pay for.11 
Tamman and Braga (2005) examined this issue by comparing millage rates 
over  time.   They  found  slight reductions in county rates, but sharp increases in total  
revenues.  Since homeowners are less likely to notice the property tax effect of a 
booming  real  estate  market,  Tamman  and  Braga  advance  the  idea  that Save Our 
                                                          
9 Total Florida savings would also include municipality property taxes, but this component is not 
estimated here. 
10 Tamman and Braga (2005). 
11 Obviously, new construction is part of the tax revenue increase, but there is no evidence that 
new construction alone is driving the statewide trend. 
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FIGURE 2.  REAL, PER CAPITA COUNTY GOVERNMENT PROPERTY TAX REVENUE 
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Source: author’s calculations on Florida Legislative Committee on Intergovernmental Relations 
data (http://fcn.state.fl.us/lcir/fiscal.html). 
 
Homes has created a layer of protection for local politicians when property tax 
revenues are increasing. 
3) Inequities 
The most glaring inequity with Save Our Homes is horizontal as similar 
Floridians can live in identical houses but receive different tax levies.  Tamman 
(2005a) illustrates this with Siesta Key condominium neighbors where the first pays 
$5,700 in countywide taxes while the second pays $2,300.  The inequity also affects 
renters and seasonal homeowners who do not receive a Save Our Homes preference.  
The latter are at a particular disadvantage as they consume less local services, but 
have faced dramatic property tax increases.  Some have claimed that Save Our 
Homes is reducing the snowbird economy and hurting the state. 
Turning to vertical equity, one can only find anecdotal evidence on 
disproportionate benefits.  Tamman (2005b) estimates that Former ITT Chairman 
Rand  Araskog  will  save  $145,000  in  county  taxes (on an $18 million Palm Beach 
mansion) and indicted former Tyco International president Dennis Kozlowski saved 
Four Easy Steps to a Fiscal Train Wreck: 
The Florida How-To Guide 
 
 
 11
$40,000.  The latter claimed Palm Beach as his official residence, but he is suspected 
of spending most of the year outside of Florida. 
4) Tax Evasion 
Homestead exemptions are a recurring tax preference and create an incentive 
to cheat.  These exemptions plus a Save Our Homes preference create a larger 
incentive.  Tamman (2005b) found a widespread problem, where appraisers were 
overmatched.  According to the article, state officials have not taken steps to help 
local appraisers identify homeowners who claim more than one homestead.  Tamman 
also found two counties that have recovered more than $2 million a year in revenue 
by aggressively trying to independently identify illegal homestead claims. 
 
Portability 
Policymakers have recognized the lock-in effect from Save Our Homes.  In 
fact, the two leading Republican candidates for Governor in 2006 have both proposed 
portability for the Save Our Homes preference.  They differ in the distance where 
portability would apply – Charlie Crist has favored statewide portability, while Tom 
Gallagher endorsed intra-county portability.12 
While the proposals attack the lock-in problem, portability would probably 
exacerbate some of the other problems.  For example, horizontal inequity between old 
and new Florida residents would worsen if the former group could take the Save Our 
Homes preference with them. 
Portability would put additional pressure on local officials to maintain (or 
even increase) millage rates.  Under the policy, the difference between the taxable 
base and market value would grow as relocating homesteads keep their tax savings.  
For example, a new subdivision creates public-service demand (e.g., roads) and a 
stream of future property tax payments.  With portability, the former would not 
change but the latter would diminish. 
 
                                                          
12 Kaczor (2006). 
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Step Three: Accumulate Sales Tax Exemptions 
“Today, our sales tax code has about 440 loopholes. Food for your 
dog or cat is taxed, but food for ostriches and racehorses is not. 
Professional football game tickets are taxed, but skyboxes aren’t. 
Limousine services are tax-free. If you buy a lawnmower, you pay a 
tax. But people who hire lawn services don’t pay a tax.” -- Floridians 
Against Inequities in Rates (website) 
 
Florida relies heavily on the general sales tax.  In 2004, it accounted for 56 
percent of total Florida state tax revenue versus 33 percent for all states.  Local 
governments currently add a rate up to 1.5 percent (to the state rate of 6 percent), but 
the use of the funds is restricted and must be specified in a local referendum adoption 
process. 
Like many other states, the Florida sales tax emphasizes goods.  The taxation 
of services is mixed, heavy on admissions/amusements and fabrication, installation 
and repair, but light on personal and computer services.13  State policymakers have 
not been aggressive in joining the streamlining movement with neither full nor 
associate member status.14 
Food and medicine have been exempt from the Florida sales tax for more than 
35 years.15    Recently, however, newer exemptions have entered the state statutes.  
Many apply to business purchases and are less likely to draw criticism from tax 
analysts.16  However, these exemptions are often industry specific, meaning the 
purchase at one firm is exempt while another firm pays the tax on a nearly-identical 
purchase.17 
Unlike many other states, Florida has enjoyed economic conditions that have 
temporarily postponed a revenue slump from base erosion.  In Figure 3, one finds 
remarkable sales tax growth over the last eleven years.  Even with the slowdown in 
fiscal 2002 and 2003, the state averaged 5.8 percent increases over the period. 
                                                          
13 Federation of Tax Administrators (2005). 
14 Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Board (2006). 
15 Both predate Due (1971). 
16 The purchase of luxury boxes for sporting events is one that does not escape criticism. 
17 For example, the purchase liquefied petroleum gas is generally exempt for agricultural firms, 
but generally taxable for other firms. 
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 FIGURE 3.  GROWTH IN STATE SALES AND USE TAX COLLECTIONS 
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 Source: author’s calculations on Florida Department of Revenue data. 
 
One likely cause for the Florida revenue increases – while the base is 
otherwise eroding – is a healthy construction industry and hurricane-recovery 
spending.  For the former, construction employment appears in Figure 4 and the 
Florida industry has grown more rapidly than the same measure for the U.S.  
Regarding hurricanes, Harper and Hawkins (2006) found that recent collections were 
roughly 7 percent higher than pre-2004-storm forecasts. 
In general, economic expansion (and the thriving real estate market) has 
prevented an erosion-driven decline in the sales tax base.  In Figure 5, one can 
observe how increases in personal income have temporarily restored the taxable 
spending share of income. 
The conditions have, however, increased Florida revenue reliance on 
durables.  Figure 6 includes limited evidence on this change.  Collections from 
automobile dealers and lumber and building retailers have increased to more than 20 
percent  of  total  general  sales  tax  revenue.   Obviously  durables  are  sold by other  
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 FIGURE 4.  CONSTRUCTION EMPLOYMENT INDEX 
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 Source: author’s calculations on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data. 
 
 FIGURE 5.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SALES TAX BASE AND PERSONAL  
 INCOME 
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 Source: author’s calculations on Florida Department of Revenue data. 
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FIGURE 6.  SHARE OF TOTAL SALES AND USE TAX COLLECTIONS FROM SELECT  
VENDOR TYPES 
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 Source: author’s calculations on Florida Department of Revenue data. 
 
retailers as well, but the vendor types have changed over time and data consistency is 
suspect. 
If one accepts the durable-reliance hypothesis, a sales tax slump will occur 
when spending on items such as automobiles and building materials slows.  In the 
slump, policymakers should expect taxable sales as a share of personal income to fall 
well below 50 percent.  The remaining questions are when will it begin, how sharp of 
a decrease will occur and when will revenue recover to somewhere near trend.18 
 
Reform Attempt, Sort of 
In 2002, State Senate President John McKay proposed lowering the general 
sales tax rate and dramatically expanding the base.  The Florida Senate approved the 
measure, but the state house rejected similar legislation.  A constitutional amendment 
approach was developed as a compromise between the two chambers. 
                                                          
18 Many believe the slowdown indicators are already evident.  Kempner (2006) may have found 
one for beachfront condominium construction. 
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Under the McKay amendments – there were three in total – most of the 
exemptions from the Florida sales tax would be scheduled to expire in January, 2009 
unless the Florida legislature voted to renew them.19  Food, prescription drugs, health 
services, residential rent, electricity and heating fuel would be automatically exempt.  
According to Dunkelberger and Follick (2006), the McKay plan did not obtain the 
necessary signatures for the 2006 election and McKay has indicated that he will not 
pursue the initiative any further. 
 
                                                          
19 Floridians Against Inequities in Rates (2006). 
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Step Four: Approve a Class Size Amendment 
In 2002, 52 percent of voters approved an amendment that obliged the Florida 
legislature to provide funding for public school classes that would not exceed 18 
students for grades pre-K to 3, 22 students for grades 4 to 8 and 25 students for 
grades 9 to 12.20  Governor Bush’s administration responded to the amendment with a 
four-stage plan.  The first was to clarify how class sizes would be measured.  The 
choice here was a district average requirement through the 2005-2006 school year, a 
school-level requirement for 2006-2007 and 2007-2008 and, finally, a class level 
requirement beginning in 2008-2009.21  Thus, in two years, every Florida classroom 
is supposed to satisfy the amendment specifications. 
The second stage was to share information on flexibility such as methods to 
reduce construction costs.  The creation of new state programs for districts to obtain 
funding was the third and the final stage was accountability measures for dealing with 
non-complying districts. 
From 2003 to 2004, school district class averages indicated progress toward 
the caps.  For example, the K-3 average had decreased from 23.07 to 20.54 (recall, 18 
is the goal).22  Similar progress was found for the grades 4-8 average and the 9-12 
average was in compliance.  The district averages, however, were misleading.  To 
paraphrase the Florida Department of Education (2004) presentation, ‘Averages do 
not tell the real story – 72 percent of students are in classrooms over constitutional 
caps.’  This means a significant spending requirement looms as the state approaches 
the 2008 deadline. 
Like the Save Our Homes amendment, the class-size amendment has created 
two significant problems.  In no particular order, they are: 
1) Production Inefficiency and Distorted Spending 
In an extreme case, education would follow something like a per-student 
Leontief technology where education per student could be determined by the 
minimum  of  (K,  L)  where  K  is  the number of classrooms per student and L is the  
                                                          
20 Brewer (2005). 
21 Florida Department of Education (2006). 
22 Florida Department of Education (2004). 
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teachers per student.  If this framework actually characterized school production, a 
class size amendment could be justified as forcing an education enhancement policy 
on politicians. 
Suppose, however, that other variables such at technology and labor quality 
affect production of education. Now, the amendment creates a potential 
inefficiency—where the state and the school districts are forced to purchase more K 
and L when the marginal return from the other factors might be larger. 
One can observe the effect of larger K purchases in Figure 7, where state-
level capital spending increases dramatically in fiscal 2007.  The related budget stress 
could mean reduced spending elsewhere and actually sacrificing other education 
inputs.  For example, new classrooms may be financed by postponing technology 
replacement.  This type of spending substitution should actually drive up the marginal 
return of the foregone input. 
 
FIGURE 7.  STATE FIXED CAPITAL OUTLAY FOR EDUCATION 
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 Source: The Bush/Brogan and Bush/Jennings Administration Budget Recommendations (various  
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2) Availability of Labor 
In the fall of 2004, Florida school systems needed 20,000 new hires.  The 30 
institutions in Florida with approved teacher education programs produced 5,400.  In 
the fall of 2006, school systems are projected to need 32,000 new hires while the 
same institutions are expected to produce 5,600.23   
Policymakers have several policy initiatives to attract new teachers.  They 
include higher salaries, a more general special education certification, easier rules for 
temporary certificates, a student loan forgiveness program and http://www. 
teachinflorida.com, a web site for drawing applicants.  These measures help the 
structural shortage – in new teacher demand less new teacher supply – but there is no 
evidence they eliminate it. 
 
Evolving Reform 
The first response to the class size amendment by many in the legislature was 
a push for repeal.  More recent efforts have focused on replacing the classroom cap 
with a countywide-average cap or an amendment easing the class size requirement 
while adding significant new funding for teacher salaries.24 
 The effect of class size on student performance is a widely researched topic 
and the findings of researchers such as Eric Hanushek, Alan Krueger and Edward 
Lazear are beyond the scope of this paper.  The policy problem is if Florida’s class 
size amendment is replaced with something else, the goal should be a better return on 
education spending.  The debate, however, does not center on return, but rather on the 
problems associated with reaching the class size caps. 
 
                                                          
23 Florida Department of Education (2005). 
24 Solochek (2006). 
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Conclusion 
For the 2006 budget, Florida policymakers agreed to a remarkable $73.9 
billion budget.  They argued over which tax cuts to approve and how to spend that 
which wasn’t cut.  Fast forward two, three, or maybe even one year and the picture 
will be very different. 
Future budgets will be shaped by reactions to the four steps the state has 
already taken toward a fiscal train wreck.  The first will be reacting to the unintended 
consequences of the Medicaid waiver.  This could be new emergency-room funding 
for treating individuals who have drained their account or, perhaps, additional 
resources for the Agency for Health Care Administration to clear confusion about the 
system. 
The second reaction will be to the other problems Save Our Homes has 
created after portability is, in all likelihood, the new statewide policy.  This could be 
transfers to counties who promise to reduce the overall millage.  Or, outside of the 
budget, we might find a Colorado-style initiative to cap local spending directly. 
A vanishing sales tax base, as durable spending slows, will be evidence of the 
third step.  The reaction might be to finally pass streamlining legislation or approve 
deep spending cuts.  Another option is a McKay-style exemption review, but the 
lobbying that inevitably follows is probably distasteful to all concerned. 
Finally, it is difficult to imagine every Florida public school actually meeting 
classroom-level class size caps.  Therefore, the policy reaction has to occur before the 
deadline with a compromise that does not generate anger voters. 
Overall, the Florida fiscal outlook is not promising.  The four steps to the 
train wreck are going to eliminate the current surplus environment and force 
policymakers to make difficult decisions.  Beyond the money, however, is the 
uncertainty on whether solutions to the train wreck are going to improve the public 
provision of goods and services and the policy-induced inefficiencies for Floridians.  
The train wreck itself will not be fatal, but the fiscal solutions may end up hurting the 
state.  Unfortunately, that risk appears to be beyond the radar of many in the policy 
arena. 
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